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In this paper we discuss the European regulation policy regarding vertical 
separation in communications and electricity industries. In the electricity sector the 
discussion concerns ownership unbundling while in communications the recent regulatory 
debate is about functional separation. We conclude that for electricity, ownership 
unbundling seems to be the best option to achieve competition in wholesale markets although 
there is still some risks concerning investment. Instead, for the communication sector the 
regulatory options are deeply dependent on the intensity of network competition between 
operators that combine different technological platforms. Technology also seems to be a key 
driver for diverse regulatory approaches concerning the unbundling requirement. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the last 25 years, both on developed and developing countries, there 
has been a sound experience of restructuring, deregulation and privatization of 
sectors that were previously regulated monopolies and most of the times also state-
owned. Reasons behind this trend were manifold: technology changes, poor 
performance of regulated firms and a general ideological shift towards markets are 
among the most important.  
A central feature in debate for network sectors concerns unbundling. The 
most common argument in favor of integration was basically twofold: it would be a 
solution to overcome, at least partially, double marginalization and it would give 
incentives to upstream investments (Höffler and Kranz, 2008). Since the 90’s and 
for most European network industries, the main political question - Should vertical 
integration be allowed? – has been replaced by two others:  
 How far that separation should go? 
 Should the same policy principles apply to all network industries, 
namely public utilities?  
In the communications sector most of the European countries already 
implemented accounting separation and the present debate is about functional 
separation. UK introduced it in 2006. Sweden and Italy followed this policy aiming 
to encourage retail competition. However, in other European countries (Netherlands, 
for instance) regulators decided to maintain vertical integration, mainly arguing that 
the incumbent firms face competition from alternative networks. 
Based upon the evidence of unbalanced cost allocation by electricity firms 
between regulated and non-regulated operations, the European Commission 
introduced the 96/92 EC Directive which required the accounting unbundling of 
both generation and retail stages of the electricity value chain from the network 
business (transmission and distribution). Later on, the 2003/54/CE Directive went 
further requiring legal unbundling as there were serious grid access problems by 
non-integrated firms. Through their transmission business, integrated companies 
acted as barriers to market competition either favouring their own generators or 
through under investments on the transmission grid. Finally, in 2007, the Third 
Energy Package was proposed by EC in order to solve, among others, this problem 
which EU Energy Sector Enquiries proved to be major barriers to liberalisation. As 
it will be explained in section 4, the final outcome of this recent EC regulatory 
initiative was a compromise that still can give place to under investment on the 
grids.  
Therefore, at the moment, communications and electricity face the same 
question: how far should the unbundling process go?  
The main goal of this paper is to analyse the arguments under discussion, 
namely: 
1. Which were the main reasons for different regulatory approaches in the 
past? 
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2.  Presently is it possible to draw some lessons from one sector to the other 
concerning the effects of different regulatory approaches on competition and 
investment? 
Overall, we conclude that ownership separation is fairly influenced by the 
economic nature of each utility infrastructure. Vickers (1995) recognizes that the 
most significant contribution of ownership unbundling to competition in network 
industries is that it reduces the incentive to discrimination by a network operator 
which belongs to the same holding group of other generators and/or retail firms. 
There is empirical evidence on the increasing congestion of transmission networks 
with the development of wholesale markets and its negative impact on competition 
(Joskow, 2005a, 2005b and 2006). Also, Hirst (2004) refers that the dynamics of 
investment in transmission capacity is far from that of trading patterns. Ownership 
unbundling achieves competition in electricity wholesale markets, although it may 
eventually lead to a concentration increase of generation through mergers. As 
presented by Balmert and Brunekreeft (2009) the EC final political compromise on 
the unbundling issue of the transmission business may raise some complicated, 
unexpected problems on investments, one of the chief arguments which the 3rd 
Package proposal aimed to solve.
3
 The EC final political compromise on the 
unbundling issue allows for three models: Full Ownership Unbundling, Deep 
Independent System Operator or the “Third Way” (Effective and Efficient 
Unbundling – EEU). In the so-called Deep-Independent System Operator model4 
the System Operator has the investment decision power, thus the network owner can 
make the investments but, doing so, it introduces a full separation between the 
decision-maker and the risk-taker which is, as Pielow et al. (2009) recognize, a 
problem both economically and legally. In the communication industry regulators 
initially favour access to the incumbent’s network (mandatory unbundling sharing) 
as a policy to promote competition. Recently, some European countries 
implemented functional separation aiming to reduce the incentives to discriminate 
the independent operators. This is the same argument as in electricity. However, the 
implementation of functional separation depends on the intensity of network 
competition between operators that combine different technological platforms.  
The structure of the paper is the following: in section 2 we present a 
theoretical framework for the comparison of the unbundling problem in both sectors. 
In section 3 we discuss the vertical separation in the communication sector, focusing 
in the recent European experiences and on the challenges from the developments of 
next generation networks. In section 4 we discuss the recent regulatory 
developments in the electricity sector highlighting the arguments in favour and 
against ownership unbundling and in section 5 we present our main conclusions. 
                                                 
3
 Balmert and Brunekreeft (2009) call the investment argument used by the European Commission the 
“strategic investment withholding”. 
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2.  A Theoretical Framework 
 
The unbundling issue, namely its most radical version - ownership 
unbundling – has been covered by the economic theory either by the neoclassical 
approach or by organisational economics. While the first focus on vertical 
integration as a firm reaction to (pre-existing) market power problems or as a firm 
action to get (or enlarge) market power on upstream (backward integration) or 
downstream markets (forward integration), the later points out to other features that 
may be rather helpful to understand the dynamics of network industries. With regard 
to those features, the organisational economics sustain that firms face a variety of 
potential transaction costs, contractual and organisational contingencies that are 
specifically connected to their business (see, for instance,  Joskow (2006) and 
Growitsch and Stronzik (2008) ). As Finger and Künneke (2006) refer in line with 
other authors who sustain the idea of co-evolution between institutions and 
technology5,  there is an interrelation between the technical and institutional 
coordination of infrastructures. They argue that in the network industries, there are 
four major functions – interconnection, interoperability, capacity management and 
system management – that are related to the network operation that enable the 
complementarily along infrastructures. Thus, there is need to have a comparable 
institutional and technological coordination to achieve a good functioning 
throughout the infrastructure. Furthermore, they argue that the infrastructure 
performance is closely related to the coherence of those coordination mechanisms. 
Network industries (telecom, electricity, gas, railways, aviation, postal 
services, etc) have unique characteristics: significant economies of scale or scope 
(extending to natural monopolies); far-reaching externalities in production or 
consumption; and large vertical and horizontal integration. According to Joskow and 
Schmalensee (1983) and Baumol and Sidak (1994), these features explain why the 
introduction of competitive mechanisms and the creation of open markets had equal 
impacts on both innovations and disruptions.  
Like other utility industries, telecommunications and electricity have 
separate activities which produce intermediate goods or services that are 
complements in the production of a final good or service. This means that there are 
strong vertical relationships. Furthermore, these industries often present significant 
economies of scale which, due to efficiency arguments, have justified being 
regulated and fully integrated.  
Another common feature between electricity and telecommunications, 
which is a crucial argument in the vertical integration decisions, is the need to 
ensure adequate incentives to invest in the networks upgrades through the expected 
returns on investments. 
                                                 
5
 See, for example, Dosi (1982), North (1990), Perez (2002), Saviotti (1996), Soete (1985) and van 
Tunzelmann (2003). 
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Additionally, vertical integration requires strong regulation in order to avoid 
the anti-competitive behaviour, which might negatively affected the incentive to 
invest, both from incumbents and new operators.6 When incumbent firms anticipate 
the regulatory obligation to share the network with rivals at regulated prices that do 
not allow the expected return of the investment, their incentive to invest is threat. 
Also, the investment from new firms might be negatively affected as the firms 
expect to use the incumbent network and so have a little incentive to build their own 
infrastructure.   
However, many arguments in favor of some degree of vertical separation 
have been advanced in the two industries under analysis. The standard arguments 
rely on the anticompetitive practices implemented by the vertically integrated firms, 
in particular when there are blocked segments, that is, when the independent 
operators have no alternatives to the vertical integrate network access in order to 
develop their activities. Other important argument is related with the reduction of 
regulatory intervention allowed by the development of competition. Vertical 
integration also has strong limitations concerning the transparency on the allocation 
of common costs, which can be use for anticompetitive purposes. Network 
externalities were also common arguments used to justify that network industries 
could not sustain competition with vertical separation.  
Therefore, the discussion on unbundling requires a careful analysis of the 
different levels of vertical separation.7  
Ownership separation requires the separation of network infrastructure from 
the services that use the infrastructure, by the creation of legal separate firms with a 
different ownership. The ownership separation might be incomplete, when there is 
partial ownership. Ownership separation is the higher degree of vertical separation 
that also implies the highest costs from loosing vertical integration.  
Legal separation is comparable to ownership separation, in the sense that it 
requires the existence of legal separate entities, but these entities have common 
ownership.8 
Functional separation requires the creation of an independent division that is 
responsible for the parts of the networks not easily replicate. This division provides 
access in an equal basis to the retail operators, including the incumbent retail 
operator. It is required that this business unit has an independent management from 
the rest of the firm. Functional separation is an intermediate form of vertical 
separation as the separate business units have common ownership. Implementing 
                                                 
6
 Grajek and Röller (2009) find empirical evidence of a negative effect of access regulation on 
investment. Also, Pindyck (2007) argues that access regulation in US discourages investment by both 
incumbents and entrants if the access prices are too low. 
7
 For a more detailed description of different degrees of vertical separation see Cave (2006) and for 
discussion applied to next generation access networks see Cave (2010). For deeper developments of 
function separation see, for instance, Tropina et al. (2010). 
8
 For a detail comparison of  legal and ownership separation see, for instance, Crémer et al. (2006) and 
Höeffler and Kranz (2008). 
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functional separation requires the existence of separate information systems and the 
training of employees in order to respect the “Chinese walls” built between the 
business units, so that non-discrimination of independent firms is achieved. 
Accounting separation is the weaker form of vertical separation as the 
upstream and downstream activities take place in the same firm. Only the accounts 
of each activity are separate. Accounting separation allows transparency about 
internal transfer prices in order to avoid price discrimination. However, this level of 
separation does not ensure non-price discrimination, such as delays or different 
product quality. Although crucial for the reform process, the separation of 
potentially competitive activities from network activities is just one dimension of the 
building of competitive markets. According to Glachant and Perez (2007) the other 
two dimensions are also very important:  modularity and sequencing. 
Baldwin and Clark (2000) define the former as “(…) a particular design 
structure, in which parameters and tasks are interdependent within modules and 
independent across them” but they clearly state that “but in a complex design, there 
are often many levels of visible and hidden information”, which means that perfect 
modularity is far from being the most common case. 
The third dimension is the implementation of those modules into the chain 
to carry the competitive transactions in the new framework. As some authors 
emphasize, the decisions sequence in the construction of competitive modular chains 
is critical and nearly as important as the actual structure of those chains. According 
to Newbery (2002), this sequence structures the behavior of the stakeholders as it 
creates new interests and new rights over both the modules and the transactions 
between them. To Aoki (2001), each institution can generate incentives and 
manages information autonomously. This may be a handicap as it can be difficult to 
economic agents to understand and to use a complex institution. But this author also 
calls the attention for the impact that the overlap of existing institutions can have on 
the evolution and the combination of their activities. 
In short, unbundling is one aspect of the complex competitive reform of 
network industries, although it may be actually the most important in the present 
stage of the European liberalization process. Although national state regulatory and 
institutional arrangements remain significant and influential (Hudson, 2003), it 
seems clear that it is a pivotal question both to competition and investment of 
network industries as electricity and communications. Notwithstanding, under a 
strict technological perspective, these industries have different characteristics that 
may pose particular regulatory challenges and may explain different corporate 
strategic moves. 
In the following sections we discuss the regulatory options concerning the 
various degrees of vertical separation recently applied in the telecommunications 
and electricity industries. 
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3.  The Communications Sector 
 
3.1. Vertical Separation: the European Experience 
The liberalization process in the telecommunications sector started in the 
mids 1980s (although with significant differences among the European countries). 
The introduction of competition reshaped the sector’ structure, as the incumbent 
firms have to share many segments of the market with the new comers. 
Additionally, many new market segments emerged due to the high level of 
technological innovation. One of the most important transformations in the sector 
was the development of competition between different technologies used to deliver 
communications services (infrastructure-based competition). Today technologies 
based on copper and optical compete with cable television networks and with 
wireless networks. 
In parallel with the liberalization there was a strong development of the 
regulatory policy, both at European and national level. Following the 2002 package 
of rules which govern the telecommunications sector in Europe, new rules were 
approved by the European Member States in November 2009.9 These new rules 
should be transposed into the national laws by May 2011. An important decision is 
the creation of the BEREC (Body of European Regulators of Electronic 
Communications), with main purpose of achieving a better coordination between the 
national regulations. 
Regarding the unbundling issue, the new rules introduced a general 
framework to evaluate and implement functional separation. This possibility may be 
used by national regulators as a remedy when other instruments “have failed to 
achieve effective competition and there are important and persisting competition 
problems and/or market failures” (article 13a, from EC Directive 2009/140) by the 
national regulators. Also, the unbundling option can be implemented voluntarily by 
the vertically integrated firms (article 13b. from EC Directive 2009/140), and 
different levels of unbundling (functional, legal, ownership) might be implemented. 
The introduction of these new rules is a clear position in favour of functional 
separation when other instruments to developed competition are no longer efficient, 
which approximates the evolution in the telecommunications sector to what is 
happening in the electricity sector. 
Traditionally network access in telecommunications (also called mandatory 
unbundling sharing) was the main instrument used by European regulators to 
promote efficient entry and competition. Vertical separation, although in discussion, 
had limited practical implementation. The reasons for this trend can be found in 
several features of the communications sector when compared with other network 
sectors, like electricity, natural gas or railways, which continue to be natural 
monopolies. Essentially due to technological developments, in communications 
there are many market segments where the entry of new firms is feasible as long as 
                                                 
9
 Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of  25 November 2009. 
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the infrastructure access is ensure. Also important to understand this evolution is the 
fact that network access involves lighter modifications in the market structure than 
any other degree of vertical separation. 
Additionally, there are important cost complementarities and economies of 
scope between network and services that enhance the vertical integration 
advantages. The introduction of new products or the upgrade of the existing ones 
frequently requires adjustments in the network, and these might be costly under 
vertical separation (Olsen et al., 2008). These arguments contribute to explain why 
the European incumbent firms’, were privatized a single integrated firm. 
However, it is crucial to point out that vertical integration has negative 
effects on competition, essentially because firms have incentives to discriminate 
against competitors.10 The discrimination can be based on prices or on other 
strategies, including raising the rivals’ costs, reducing the quality of the input 
delivered to downstream competitors or reducing rivals’ demand.11 
Vertical separation may also allow a reduction on the regulatory 
intervention, as anticompetitive behavior is much less likely to occur12 and this effect 
is more intense as deeper is the vertical separation. 
 Recently the European debate about vertical separation was 
intensified and accompanied by some practical implementation. Certainly, this trend 
is not independent on the observation that, in several markets, the access regulation 
was not able to develop real competition in the downstream segments (Bijl, 2005). 
For instance, Olsen et al. (2008) referred that, in the Danish market for ADSL-
services, it is even difficult to ensure equal treatment of all operators through 
regulation. Also, in Italy, there was a slow implementation of Local Loop 
Unbundling until 2006 (Baake, 2006). For the UK, Whalley and Curwen (2008) 
argue that “Service based competition had been possible since the late 1990s but had 
enjoyed limited success because, it was alleged, BT had abused its dominant 
position”. 
In order to analyze the development of retail competition in European 
countries we present information about the fixed broadband access market in 2005 
and 2009 (Tables 1 and 2). In spite of the significant heterogeneity between 
countries, the data supports the conclusion that network access allowed the 
development of competition in the retail markets. The date distinguished four 
different types of network access: (i) Resale - the entrant resells the services 
provided by the incumbent, without introducing specific features; (ii) Bitstream 
access - the incumbent installs a high speed access to the final consumer and the 
                                                 
10
 To a deeper discussion of this argument see Cave and Doyle (2007), Doyle (2008) and the references 
therein. 
11
 These strategies are often called sabotage. For details see Mandy and Sappington (2007). 
12
 For a detailed description of the merits and disadvantages of functional and structural separation see 
Bijl (2005), OECD (2003, 2007) and Cave and Doyle (2007). For an analytical approach see 
Sappington (2006), Doyle (2008), Kirsh and Hirschhausen (2008) and Gomez-Ibanez (2003). 
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entrant uses this access, having some freedom in the definition of its services; (iii) 
Share access – both incumbent and entrant use the same line, in which the 
incumbent continues to deliver telephone service and the entrant provides high 
speed data services; (iv) Full local loop unbundling - the incumbent rents a line that 
is exclusively used by the entrant. This type of access allows more freedom in the 
specification of its services. Therefore, resale corresponds to the simplest type of 
entry and the one that requires less investment from the entrants. Additionally, it is 
the type of entry that weakly contributes for the development of a competitive retail 
market. On the other extreme, full local looping unbundling is the type of 
unbundling that strongly contributes for the development of competition, as it allows 
the entrants to offer competing services. 
 
Source: EC (2008a) 
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Source: EC (2008a) 
 
In the period 2005-2009, and for most of the countries, new entrants had 
globally gained market share. In Slovenia, Germany and Greece the new entrants’ 
DSL lines increased 31.1, 22.5 and 19.7 percentage points. The significant exception 
is Malta with decrease of 49.2 percentage points.  
There was also a reduction in resale and a pronounced increased in the types 
of access that allow the development of differentiate strategies for the entrants (in 
particular Full LLU). Malta and UK are two cases of a strong reduction in the 
proportion of resale (56.8 and 35.6 percentage points, respectively). Greece, France 
and Portugal are the countries with higher increases of Full LLU (33.4; 28.6 and 
21.6 percentage points, respectively). In particular due to the reduction in resale the 
incumbent’s direct control over end-users has reduced below 50% of the European 
broadband market in 2009 (EC,  2009b) 
Overall, this information suggests that in the period 2005-2009 there was an 
increase in the competitive level of the retail broadband markets. However, it also 
clearly displays the heterogeneity in the entry process in the broadband access 
market among the European countries. 
From these data we can also understand why network access was no more 
able to allow further development of competition and that stronger decisions were 
necessary in some European countries. The debate on vertical separation came to the 
front of discussion with the implementation of functional separation of British 
Telecom (BT) in 2006. In 2005, Ofcom studied the vertical separation of BT in two 
companies, one of which would supply retail services while the other would supply 
the wholesale services to all suppliers of retail services. However, in 2006, and with 
the agreement of BT, Ofcom decided for functional separation, which does not 
involve the creation of a legal independent firm. Functional separation implies the 
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separation of the parts of the network that are difficult to replicate but that are 
necessary to provide final services (ERG, 2007). This decision leaded to the creation 
of Openreach, a division operationally independent from BT. Openreach is in charge 
of the management of the incumbent’s network and also of the provision of access to 
the network, not only to the retail departments of BT but to independent operators as 
well. Accordingly to Ofcom this arrangement is more effective in securing non 
discriminatory practices and in encouraging investment in network than the access 
price regulation.13 The evaluation made by Ofcom of the functional separation is 
globally positive.14 This is supported by the significant increase in the unbundled 
lines in UK: the sum of Full LLU with Share access lines increased from 73 140 in 
2005 to 4.76 millions in 2008 (EC, 2008a). Notwithstanding, Ofcom systematically 
mentions several features that need to be improved. One is the separation of the 
information systems between Openreach and the rest of BT. Without this separation 
that requires the effectiveness of the “Chinese walls”, is quite difficult to avoid the 
non-discriminatory behaviour of BT.  
Several other European regulators and incumbent firms are studying 
functional separation. In 2008, Telecom Italia announced the creation of Open 
Access, a division inspired in the UK Openreach (Whalley and Curwen, 2008).15 In 
Denmark there are also some proposals to follow the UK example (Olsen et al., 
2008). In 2007, the Netherlands regulator decided not to implement vertical 
separation. The main arguments relay on the existence of an alternative 
infrastructure (cable), and on the potential negative effects on investment in NGN 
(Whalley and Curven, 2008). On the contrary, in 2008, TeliaSonera agree with the 
Swedish regulator the implementation of functional separation. 
Overall, we conclude that in recent years there is a great diversity of 
strategies among the European countries concerning vertical integration. As one 
important argument is based on the development of alternative infrastructures, we 
present in detail information (Tables 3 and 4) about the weight of each 
infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 This is also the opinion of Reding (2007). 
14
 For a detailed analysis and reference of the Ofcom evaluation reports see Whalley and Curwen 
(2008). 
15
 According to Amendola et al. (2007), operational separation was introduced in Italy in 2002, and its 
positive effects in terms of increasing of LLU lines and decline in wholesale prices were already visible 
in 2005. The operational separation is a lighter form of vertical separation than functional separation. 
For a detail comparison between the Italian and the British models see Amendola et al. (2007). 
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Table 3 - Broadband access July 2005
Others
Cable
DSL
 
Source: EC (2008a) 
 
 
Source: EC (2008a) 
 
It stands out that DSL continues to be the dominant infrastructure in the 
broadband access in many countries. In France, Germany, Greece, Italy and Cyprus, 
the DSL has a market share above 90%. Then, for these countries it is difficult to 
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consider that the competitive pressure of the alternative platforms is a strong 
argument in favor of the vertical integration. Different evolution is observed, in 
Netherlands, Belgium and Sweden, where DSL’ market share are below 62%.16 
Also, it is worth mention that countries where DSL is the dominant platform 
are among those that have more broadband lines: Germany has 20.2% of all 
broadband fixed lines of the 27 European countries, France and UK have 15.7% and 
14.9%, followed by Italy, Spain and Netherlands (EC, 2008).17 
Most of the European regulators still  devote great effort to the protection of 
competition between different operators which provide services over the incumbent 
infrastructure (intra-platform competition). Differently, the US emphasizes 
competition between networks, DSL, cable, wireless, etc (inter-platform 
competition). In this line, the US regulator ended the mandatory unbundling sharing 
by telephone companies, as cable network were never subject to unbundling sharing, 
neither in US or in Europe (Wallsten and Hausladen, 2009). 
 
3.2. The Effects of Vertical Separation on Investment 
In spite of the positive effects on competition, vertical separation might also 
have significant negative effects. Besides the structural effects on industries 
organization not easily reverted, it is important to evaluate the impact of vertical 
separation at two different levels: coordination costs and incentives to invest. The 
first level concerns the possible increase of the coordination costs and the sacrifice 
economies of scope resulting from vertical separation. The introduction of new 
services frequently requires adjustments in the network and this might be costly to 
implement under vertical separation (Olsen et al., 2008). One example of this 
problem is found in the complaints of UK independent operators about the 
interaction with BT after the creation of Openreach. Furthermore, Amendola et al. 
(2007) argue that for deeper vertical separation (as is the case of functional 
separation relative to operational separation) the negative effects are more 
pronounced due to an increase in transaction cost and to the lower incentives to 
invest and innovate. 
The second level is related with the potential negative effects of vertical 
separation on the incentives to invest and innovate caused by many factors as: 
i) the easier access to the incumbent’s network discourages the investment by 
independent operators in their own networks, and then the “ladder of 
investment”18 is interrupted. Therefore, the regulatory goal of developed 
                                                 
16
 Notice that in some countries (Bulgaria, Czech Republic or Romania, to name a few) the DLS’ 
market share is low but the absolute values for broadband lines are also very small (see Table I in 
Appendix). 
17
 See Table I in Appendix. 
18
 The “ladder of investment” theory (Cave and Vogelsang, 2003; Cave, 2006) foresees that initially 
the entrant firms use the incumbent firm’s network to deliver their products and this allows retail 
competition. After the initial period, new entrants will invest in their own infrastructure competing with 
the incumbent firm also at the upstream segments of the market. 
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infrastructure competition might be weakened. The empirical observations of 
Crandall and Sidack (2002) for the USA markets support this argument. 
Furthermore, the vertical separation might intensify the dependence of the 
alternative operators from the incumbent’s network. 
ii) it may cause a delay in the decisions to invest, in particular when the 
coordination between network investments and services specifications is 
crucial. Amendola et al. (2007) relate the delay in UK investments in NGN 
with the functional separation of BT, arguing that the countries where 
functional separation was not adopted are also the countries with more 
investment in NGN. 
iii) it may reinforce the market power at the wholesale level with negative 
consequences for the development of infrastructure network competition and, 
thus, with negative effects on investment and innovation at this level. 
 
3.3. Next Generation Networks (NGN) 
With the development of NGN, the same network can deliver to final 
consumers different services (voice, data, video, high definition television, etc). 
Then, there is room for significant economies of scale and scope (Doyle, 2008; 
ERG, 2007). This perspective supports the argument of the incumbent firms that 
wish to maintain and develop vertically integrated networks. In this context, old 
concerns about the exercise of market power the network rise out again. 
“Leveraging market power in telecommunications is a live and real issue and is 
becoming more pertinent in the context of NGN and NGA investments” (Doyle, 
2008). 
The communications sector is at this moment in a crucial period. Huge 
investments in fibre optical network are vital for the development of the NGN and 
the incumbent firms are large investors. Functional separation, designed to solve 
more efficiently the problem of discrimination may have negative effects on the 
incentives to invest. As was mentioned above, OPTA decided not to implement 
functional separation because of the potential negative effects on the incentive to 
invest in NGN. 
Additionally, the technical changes introduced by NGNs might have 
consequences on the decision of vertical separation. Until recently 
“telecommunication services were delivered on dedicated networks: telephony on 
PSTN, data services on data networks, television on cable networks.” (Olsen et al., 
2008), and access price regulation intended to incentive downstream competition. 
However, this is rapidly changing with the development of NGN and it is 
foreseeable the development of competitive networks. A re-evaluation of the 
arguments in favor and against vertical separation in communication sector is 
necessary in this new framework. Kirsch and Hirschhausen (2008) argue that, from a 
technological point of view, as NGN allow the provision of several services thought 
the combination of different physical network infrastructure, there will be a 
separation of infrastructure and services and, consequently, a reduction in the 
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economies of scope between infrastructure and services. Then, the authors claim that 
“structural separation becomes less costly as technical synergy losses from the 
separation of access networks are mitigated” (Kirsch and Hirschhausen, 2008. p.71). 
This is also in line with Cave and Hatta (2009), who conclude that the costs of 
separation can be lower under the NGN framework. However, these authors also call 
the attention for the possible increase in transaction costs. 
In this respect it is worth to mention the empirical results obtained by 
Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) using data from the broadband access in European 
countries. The authors conclude that the more a country relies on access network, 
the less incumbent and entrants invest in next generation networks. Also, they found 
that entrants that provide services over their infrastructure and firms that face strong 
competition from cable networks are the ones that invest more in fiber. These 
conclusions support the idea that competition between networks stimulates 
investment and innovation. 
Overall, we observe that in telecommunications markets firms can offer to 
final consumers bundles of services (triple play, for instance) that are provided 
through the combination of different technological platforms. Also, competition 
between networks is already a reality. Therefore, competition between vertically 
integrated firms that in the past had a single dominant technology may be reinforced, 
decreasing the concerns about market power effects. 
 
4.  The Electric Power Sector 
 
The physical characteristics of the electricity supply industry are the main 
determinants of its optimal regulatory design. The industry has large sunk costs, its 
value chain is composed by four vertical stages with different optimal scales 
(generation, transmission, distribution and retailing) and it is a single product 
industry of a non-storable good delivered through a network, requiring instantaneous 
supply and demand physical balance. 
 
4.1. The Energy Directives: from Full Integration to Vertical Separation 
Balancing generation and consumption is one of the most complex technical 
problems to be solved. It arises from the electricity market specific features: the 
need for continuous electrical equilibrium, unexpected demand and supply 
fluctuations, a limited capacity to establish and send price signals to market 
participants on a continuous basis and also a small short-run elasticity of demand 
(Fehr et al., 2005). 
A real-time balance between generation and electricity consumption (both 
by end users and the grid itself) is crucial for safeguarding transmission system 
security. As electricity is not storable19, disturbances of equilibrium between 
generation and load make the system frequency to deviate from its set value which, 
                                                 
19
 Only hydro systems with dominance of large water reservoirs allow for some degree of storage. 
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according to the extent of that deviation, can affect the behavior of electrical 
equipment or lead to the (protective) disconnection of generation plants. Large 
deviations may even cause system black-outs.   
Different types of transmission institutional arrangements may cover either 
partially or completely the European power system. Almost all continental systems 
(managed by different transmission organizations under different regulations) are 
interconnected and synchronized (every system has the same frequency all the time). 
These interconnected systems create strong externalities between zones (e.g. loop 
flows20). This is not the case for the UK power system. It is an “isolated” system, 
thus it is not synchronized with the continental system (it is interconnected by DC 
lines21). In this case, externalities are much smaller than in continental Europe as 
there are no loop flows. Thus, the coordination of the whole European power system 
is not an easy task but it is an absolute condition, as to increase cross-border 
competition as well as the internalization of cross-border externalities (Thomas, 
2007). 
The importance of transmission, a natural monopoly that has to be 
regulated, is not proportional to its share on the total cost of supplied electricity: 
about 5% according to some authors always under 10% according to others22. 
Retailers and generating firms (particularly those with large power plants) have the 
greatest interest on transmission network.23 Both for generation and retailing, 
competitive markets suppose access to the network on equal, non-discriminatory 
conditions. This is the main reason why unbundling is necessary. However, how far 
this should go remains controversial. 
There is sound empirical evidence of the benefits and cost savings 
from vertical integration (see, for example, Kaserman and Mayo, 1991; 
Fraquelli et al., 2005). Advantages are manifold. We can distinguish, among 
others: the reduction of transportation costs if common ownership results in 
closer geographic proximity as well as the reduction of coordination costs; 
control over inputs – (in generation) is increased, which allows for 
differentiation in favor of related businesses; entry barriers are increased and 
                                                 
20
 Loop flow: The movement of electric power from generator to load by dividing along multiple 
parallel paths; it especially refers to power flow along an unintended path that loops away from the 
most direct geographic path or contract path (EIA 2008). 
21
 Direct current (DC) is the unidirectional flow of electric charge. Direct current is produced by such 
sources as batteries, thermocouples, solar cells, and commutator - type electric machines of the dynamo 
type. Direct current may flow in a conductor such as a wire, but can also be through semiconductors, 
insulators, or even through a vacuum as in electron or ion beams. In direct current, the electric charges 
flow in a constant direction (AC). 
22
 See, for example, Thomas (2007) and Marques (2003). 
23
 Households and industrial customers (except a very small part of the largest consumers that are 
supplied directly by the transmission network) are connected to the (low voltage) distribution network. 
Small generators and most renewable and combined heat and power (CHP) generators feed directly 
into the distribution network. 
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may be used by integrated incumbents against potential competitors; finally, 
the integrated utility is able to capture profit margins either upstream and 
downstream. 
The reform of the European electricity industry started in Great Britain in 
1989 through a massive privatization and restructuring program. The basic 
assumption for the reform was that competition would force power firms to become 
more efficient, engaging lower prices and better services.  
Electricity competitive reforms comprehend four inter-related steps: 
privatization of state-owned assets; opening the market to competition; the 
unbundling of transmission and distribution from generation and retailing; the 
introduction of an independent regulator. However, the EU liberalization process 
only concerned directly the three last steps. The EU Directives have never 
mentioned privatization as a necessary condition to accomplish the competitive 
reforms. Nevertheless, the empirical evidence made it clear that liberalization could 
not be pursued without privatization of former state owned monopolies (Pollitt, 
2009). 
All EU countries have been required to unbundle and liberalise their 
wholesale and retail markets since 1998. However, the consequences on competition 
and on prices are still far from what was expected from the implementation of EC 
Directives.  According to Hall et al. (2009) ownership concentration remains a core 
feature of the European electricity market despite the competitive reform. 
Electricity systems were highly integrated worldwide, most of the times 
fully integrated, until the 90’s. This meant that the different stages of the electricity 
value chain remained in the same firm, most of the times state-owned. The electric 
power industrial organization presented a similar organization worldwide: highly 
controlled monopolies in exclusive (franchise) areas.   
The traditional model presented four main characteristics: vertical 
integration, state ownership, monopoly and a whole, final tariff that consumers must 
pay without any chance to choose their supplier. 
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Figure 1. The Electric Power Industry: traditional model 
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The electricity value chain has four stages: generation from a variety of 
sources; transmission which is the transport of high voltage electricity over long 
distances;  distribution  as the local transportation at lower voltage to final 
customers; and at last, the retailing activities which comprehend the selling and 
billing to final consumers.  
A high vertical integration between the four stages of the value chain was 
quite frequent, although other cases concerned only the integration between 
generation and transmission or between distribution and retail. Another important 
feature of electricity companies was – still is in several cases – their large size and 
importance within national frontiers. The economic arguments for the traditional 
model are the significant vertical economies which could be obtained. Those 
economies are particularly evident between generation and transmission.  
Meanwhile, there are also significant economies of density in distribution, especially 
to smaller customers. But there are three kinds of economic incentives for vertical 
integration that are generally presented: the reduction of transactions costs but also 
distortions arising from market power of upstream activities or/and downstream 
activities and information improvement (OECD, 2001). The argument used for 
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market power distortions remains particularly interesting due to its assumptions. 
Starting from the fact that, whenever a price differs from marginal cost, there is a 
loss in overall welfare, the argument in favor of vertical integration was that it 
would ensure that the firm would sell to its downstream partner at a price equal to 
marginal cost.  
Since the 19(90)’s the EU energy policy has introduced deep and extensive 
changes on electricity and natural gas markets that  have completely modify the old 
energy paradigm. Three Electricity Directives have been set: 1996, 2003 and 2009. 
As Pollitt (2009) refers, these Directives also had a significant impact on the energy 
policy of two European non-EU countries: Norway and Switzerland.  
The Directives general model for electricity considered the four separate 
activities mentioned above where electricity generation is known as wholesale 
activity. The rationale behind the Directives was clear: wholesale and retail activities 
could be made competitive, thus the prices would be set by markets as the core 
assumption was that sectors which are run on competitive rules are more efficient 
than those run as monopolies. The final result should be lower prices to the final 
consumers. Transmission and distribution were natural monopolies and prices would 
be set by an independent Regulator. 
The liberalization process has been a dynamic, huge task, since it has 
involved various problems: the enlargement of national to regional markets, the 
reduction of entry barriers to new competitors on generation and retail, the 
reforming of transmission and distribution regulation emphasizing investment 
incentives and considering scattered, intermittent renewable generation. Independent 
regulation also proved to be critical for the achievement of the reforms.  The three 
Electricity Directives can be seen not just as the legislative background of the 
liberalization process but also as a process of learning by doing and learning by 
other experiences around the world. Notwithstanding the broader scope of the EU 
Directives, the unbundling issue stands as the core of the controversy about the best 
strategy to break down persistent barriers to cross-border trade, investment and 
competition (Buchan, 2007).  
The unbundling process dates from the 96/92/CE Directive which 
introduced the independence of Transmission Operators (TSO) and Distribution 
Operators (DSO) from generation and trade. For TSOs this separation should be, at 
least on management, and for DSOs the independence should be on accountability.  
According to Thomas (2007) the distinction between the network ownership 
and the network operation was already implicit. In fact, the Directive imposed that 
the access to the networks should be available to all wholesalers and retailers on 
equal terms. Moreover, an independent regulatory board was supposed to ensure that 
this access should be impartial and in the competitive stages of the value chain 
(wholesale and retail businesses) that competition should be fair. Thus, the crucial 
question should be who controls the network – respectively, the TSO and the DSO – 
not the network owners. However, the empirical evidence proved that the 1st 
Directive was unable to attain its main goals. 
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However, under accounting unbundling, integrated utilities could still 
allocate costs to the advantage of the firm. As there were common costs shared by 
generation and transmission, the opportunity to have a substantial share of those 
costs inappropriately allocated to the network business was real.  The final outcome 
was the unjustified increase of scale economies. 
The 2003/54/CE Directive went further. Transmission and Distribution 
should be, at least, legally unbundled. Thus, for both segments of the value chain, 
management should be legally independent from generation and supply. Once again, 
the rationale behind the 2nd Directive was the concern about non-discriminatory 
access to electricity (and gas) networks but also a reasonable doubt on whether 
current arrangements were delivering efficient and timely investments in 
transmission capacity.  
Legal unbundling is a better form of unbundling, as it requires that the grid 
should be owned and operated by a firm whose exclusive activity is the network 
business. Although the cost allocation issue might be solved, other problems may 
arise due to the fact that the network can be owned by a firm which may belong to 
the same holding group. The 2nd Directive confirmed the new electricity 
organization model (Figure 2) where: generation and trading businesses are 
competitive, there is full incompatibility between monopolist and competitive 
activities and there is vertical and horizontal separation. 
 
Figure 2. The New Electricity Model 
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Notwithstanding, the enquiries carried out by the European Commission in 
2005 and 200624 concluded for the existence of severe problems concerning the 
effective liberalization of the European energy market, namely: insufficient market 
                                                 
24
  See EC (2005, 2006, 2007a and 2007b). 
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integration, lack of transparency, lack of confidence on price determination, market 
concentration and small downstream market competition.25 
 
4.2. The 3
rd
 Energy Package: Unbundling and Competition 
Market integration is a fundamental tool to improve competition in national 
markets. Although great improvements had been made - real capacity margin have 
improved from less than 5% in 2005 to 7.6% in 2006 - there was still a large work to 
be done to get a fully integrated market. Most of the European countries presented 
an interconnection capacity (in relation to installed generation capacity) between 
10% and 30%. Both the lack of transparency and the lack of confidence on prices 
determination may be translated, among others, by the diversity of prices and the 
consumer perception on change of electricity prices.26 
While there were prices that could be easily explained, there was also 
evidence of large discrepancies which were less understandable. Different kinds of 
fuels used in generation can be responsible for both high prices and high price 
volatility. Weather conditions are another cause of high prices, for they can explain 
more pressure on demand and, in the case of small rain, the reliance of electricity 
generation on thermal plants. However, the diversity of tax share on final prices was 
also remarkably wide. Moreover, as EC studies on impact assessment recognized 
(EC, 2007d) from 1998 to 2006, in countries with ownership unbundling, household 
electricity prices rose by 5.9%, while the increase in countries without ownership 
unbundling attained 29.5%.27  
Despite the bias introduced by the existence of regulated industrial tariffs in 
some countries, there was an evident dispersion of prices for the same type of 
customer. Tax share on final prices also presented (still presents) significant 
differences among member states. In ownership unbundled markets28 the electricity 
price for industrial consumers decreased by 3.0% along the same period of time, 
while in markets without ownership unbundling this price increased by 6.0% (EC, 
2007d). 
Concentration plays a very important role on the final impact of the 
competitive reform. The competitive stages of the electric power industry show high 
concentration levels (EC, 2009a) Tables II and III (see Appendix) show the 
concentration level of the European electricity markets for 2006 and 2007 
respectively for the wholesale and the retail markets. 
                                                 
25
 For a detailed analysis see EC (2002, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007b, 2007c, 2008b). 
26
 See Tables 1A, 1B and 2 in Appendix. 
27
 The application of regulated tariffs for household consumers can explain why prices were not as 
sensitive as it would be expected to changes in market conditions. 
28
See, for instance, EC(2007a) and Thomas (2007). 
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Out of 25 countries, 12 presented a Herfindhal-Hirschman Index29 in the 
generation stage above 5 000 for the electricity generation segment (very high 
concentration), 5 were highly concentrated (HHI between 1 800 and 5 000) and only 
8 of them had a moderately concentrated generation structure (HHI between750 and 
1800). 
Concentration was also remarkable on retailing (Table 2). Out of the 27 EU 
member states and Norway, 6 had a single company dominating over 5% of the 
retail market and in 22 countries the 3 largest companies had an aggregated market 
share over 40% (EC, 2009a).30 
The 3rd Energy Package proposed in 2007 by the European Commission – 
coming into force on the 3rd March 2011 - represented a strong attempt to reinforce 
the unbundling and its effects on competition, and to solve electricity and gas 
problem of network under-investment. This new legislative package comprehended 
the formation of a European Network of Transmission System Operators (ENTSO)8 
for electricity and gas for the implementation of common standards in order to 
facilitate cross-border energy supplies, the establishment of an agency as a new 
body to coordinate the actions of the national regulatory authorities (ACER) and 
more stringent unbundling rules designed to ensure effective independence of the 
network business from the rest of the vertically integrated energy utilities.  
The main argument used by the EC to propose the unbundling regulation to 
the electricity and gas sectors was the disappointing development of competition in 
the European energy markets. Furthermore, it also argued that network capacity 
scarcity were serious threats to the security of supply but also acted as national 
market barriers in favour of incumbents. Under this perspective, the new legislation 
was assumed to be a crucial (although controversial) tool to implement the European 
Energy Market. 
Although the impact assessment presented by the EC to support ownership 
unbundling, covered a wide range of variables, there was considerable criticism on 
the examples presented. Most of these impacts were analysed on past empirical 
evidence.  According to those studies, full ownership unbundling revealed a general 
positive impact on the energy market, in particular by stimulating investment, 
reducing market concentration and contributing to the reduction of energy prices. On 
the other hand, there was no empirical evidence of eventual negative effects on 
credit ratings, share prices, R&D and the relationship with external suppliers (EC, 
2007d). According to the Commission, due to the EU dependence on fuel imports, 
namely on Russian gas, ownership unbundling presented another advantage: it 
                                                 
29
 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. It 
is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in the market and then summing the 
resulting numbers. 
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would ensure that “energy networks could not be owned either by EU suppliers or 
by non-EU supply companies” (EC, 2007d, p.45). 
The 2007 EC initial proposal was concentrated on the debate upon two 
particular institutional arrangements of the electricity transmission – the 
Independent Transmission System Operator (ITSO)31 and the Legally Unbundled 
Transmission System Operator (LTSO)32 – other 5 models of transmission 
ownership can be identified worldwide: the Independent System Operator (ISO), the 
Hybrid Independent System Operator/Independent Transmission Owner (ISO/ITO) 
and the traditional model of Vertical Integration (VI).  
The National Grid in England and Wales is an example of ITSO. It is fully 
unbundled from the rest of the system and the firm owns and operates transmission 
assets. According to Lévêque et al. (2008), this may be the first-best arrangement 
under a national (isolated) perspective framework, where the transmission 
organization and the regulator cover the entire system. These cases have no cross-
border externalities and cross-border competition in generation is small.  
An example of LTSO is the French RTE since 2005. The transmission 
owner and the operator are independent but they are 100%-owned by the vertically 
integrated utility. According to Pollitt (2008), this is an increasingly common model. 
The ISO model exists in several electricity markets, including the USA and 
in Europe. In the USA, it is the case for PJM interconnection,33and in Europe for the 
Scottish Electricity. The system operator does not own the transmission assets but it 
is ownership-unbundled from the rest of the system. 
In the ISO/ITO hybrid model, both of the organizations are ownership 
unbundled from the rest of the system and the Independent Transmission Owner 
(ITO) has no operation function.  This is the case for Nord Pool, but also for 
Argentina and  Chile. Nord Pool is a particularly interesting case, namely due to the 
ISOs regional coordination and to the significant public ownership of assets.34 
Finally, there is still the vertically integrated utility (VI). While the 
Directives have introduced regulation that removed this model from the possible 
institutional arrangements, it is still de facto in place in some European power 
markets. 
The Third Energy Package35 was finally adopted on 13 July 2009 after a 
long struggle against different national interests and perspectives. This new Gas & 
                                                 
31
 Corresponding to Full Ownership Unbundling. 
32
 Corresponding to Deep-ISO. 
33
  PJM is a regional transmission organization that manages the high voltage electric grid and the 
wholesale electricity that serves 13 states and the District of Columbia. 
34
 See Bergman, (2002, 2003). 
35 
This package consist of five new legal acts: Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules for the 
internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC; Directive 2009/73/EC concerning 
common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC; Regulation 
(EC) No 713/2009 establishing an Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators; Regulation (EC) 
No 714/2009 on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity and 
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Electricity Directive will come into force on 03/03/2011. In its final version, it 
allows for three alternative institutional arrangements: (Full) Ownership Unbundling 
(OU), (Deep) Independent System Operator (ISO) and the Effective and Efficient 
Unbundling (EEU) or “the third way”.36 
In the ownership unbundling option of electricity and gas TSOs, the EC 
preferred option, the ownership of transmission assets have to be transferred to 
completely independent third parties that will have to operate the networks. In those 
Member States where TSOs are public, they can remain as such. 
In the ISO model, the member-state appoints an external entity (independent 
from the vertically integrated firm) to assume the Transmission System Operator 
functions. However, the integrated firm is allowed to retain its transmission assets in 
its balance sheet. 
In the Effective and Efficient Unbundling (EEU) model, basically supported 
by France and Germany, the Transmission System Operator stays inside the 
vertically integrated firm and the transmission assets stay in the firm balance sheet. 
However, the regulation burden is reinforced in order to guarantee the ITO 
independence towards the vertically integrated holding. In this model, transmission 
assets remain in the balance sheet of the vertically integrated firm only as financial 
assets. According to Säcker (2008) and Balmert and Brunekreeft (2009), the “third 
way” is a continuation of the Vertically Integrated model but under stronger legal 
unbundling rules and given more capacity to the Regulator to intervene in what 
concerns network investments. 
 In a report of March 2010 (EC, 2010), the European Commission 
recognized it had applied a high number of procedures (against 25 Member States 
for electricity and against 21 Member States for gas) for serious violations 
concerning 2003 Directives. Those procedures concerned several violations of the 
current legal framework namely: lack of transparency, lack or insufficient 
coordination among transmission operators to allow for the maximum 
interconnection capacity available, small regional cooperation (or even no 
cooperation at all), insufficient effective intervention by national regulators. 
In fact, most of the problems identified by the Commission in 2005 and 
2006 still hold. This is confirmed by recent data collected on market concentration 
(Tables IV and V in Appendix) and unbundling of network operators, respectively 
Transmission System Operators (Table 5) and Distribution System Operators (Table 
6). 
In the last two years, the electricity wholesale market presented a slight 
decrease of concentration (in terms of generation capacity) which was reflected in a 
                                                                                                                              
repealing Regulation (EC) No 1228/2003; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009 on conditions for access to the 
gas transmission networks and repealing Regulation (EC) No 1775/2005. 
36
 A third option was proposed by a group of eight Member States led by France and Germany at the 
end of January 2008, as the negotiations on the European Council and the European parliament 
continued. 
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lower Herfindhal - Hirschman Index for 10 Member States. However, concentration 
remains high in most regions. This is particularly important as the European 
Electricity Market is, for the moment, mostly the assemblage of regional markets. 
For the whole retail market, concentration remains very high with few 
exceptions. The market share of the three largest firms is still above 80% in 14 
Member States (EC, 2010).37 
Since 2006/2007, there was no evolution in what concerns TSO unbundling 
(Table 5). The only exception happened in 2009 with the first case of an electricity 
cross-border TSO38. 
 
Table 5. Electricity TSOs Unbundling 
 
 
Source: EC (2009) 
 
4.3. Unbundling Options and Network Investment 
The need for the improvement of transmission investment is closely related 
to liberalization and competition. Congestion of the transmission networks has 
greatly increased with the development of wholesale markets (Joskow, 2005a, 
2005b). This is also referred by Hirst (2004) who also argues that investment in 
transmission capacity has not followed the pace of changes in trading patterns. 
Joskow (2006) explains how transmission congestion (and related reliability 
                                                 
37
 The new European regulation concerns both electricity and gas but only high voltage/long distance 
transmission networks. The distribution networks are subject to the 2nd Energy Directives (2003). 
38
 E.ON sold its high-voltage transmission network to the Dutch state-owned TSO (TenneT). 
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constraints) creates load pockets, thus reducing competition among generators, and 
how this leads policymakers to impose mitigation rules which create other kind of 
market distortions. 
Part of the lack of investment in interconnections can be explained by 
conflicts of interest within vertically integrated utilities. Strategic response by agents 
with market power may oppose investment objectives. This was one of the most 
important assumptions of the 3rd Energy Package, namely the EC initial proposal on 
ownership unbundling and also on the powers attributed to the Agency for the 
Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) created by the Regulation (EC) No. 
713/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009.  It will be 
ACER which will ensure the regulatory oversight of cross-border issues. 
There were two basic assumptions of the 3rd Energy Package: (i) vertically 
integrated firms do not want to expand their own networks into markets where they 
are not currently competitive players or where their expectations to become 
competitors are small; (ii) the second assumption is a corollary of the former: a 
network expansion would mean new rivals in their own national market.  
As we have already mentioned, the EC used some empirical evidence to 
support the argument that ownership unbundling would increase network investment 
and thus improve competition in national markets: 13 Member States had already 
implemented ownership unbundling in electricity. Having transmission as their only 
business, those companies acted accordingly to their business profile: of companies 
using auctions to ration congested capacity, those which were unbundled reinvested 
33% of congestion auction revenue into new capacity investments. Instead, bundled 
companies only reinvested 17%. Meanwhile, it was also admitted that there was 
empirical evidence on the decline of network investment along transition periods 
due to the ownership unbundling regime (Buchan, 2007). 
In the absence of sound empirical evidence, it is worth asking if ownership 
unbundling really matters in which concerns network expansion. It seems clear that 
the most important driver of real investments is the expected rate of return. At the 
same time, major risks of network investments are undoubtedly connected to 
regulation and political instability. In Europe, we would say that regulatory risk may 
be is assumed the most serious risk.  
Forecasting future investment needs (and costs) for electricity network 
business is highly problematic, as asymmetric information between the regulator and 
the firm is the core question. This has always been one of the most complicated 
challenges to regulation, as asymmetric information is also associated to adverse 
selection problems (Joskow, 2008). Regulatory changes are expected to be 
implemented on transmission but also on distribution. Incentive regulation and 
incentive regulatory mechanisms are complex variables to be taken into account by 
network investors. 
The effective capacity of ACER to intervene at cross-border level will be 
crucial to create a stable regulatory framework for cross-border investments, and to 
decrease or minimize the regulatory risk. Regulatory stability is crucial to facilitate 
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investments and these are a main driver of market integration and competition 
improvement. ACER will become fully operational in March 2011 and it is expected 
that it will provide a framework at EU level for national regulators to cooperate. 
However, as the final compromise on ACER covered mainly cross-border issues – 
although redressing the regulatory gap on cross-border issues and providing 
regulatory oversight of the cooperation between transmission system operators – its 
effective capacity to fulfill the unbundling legislation ambitious goals remain 
dubious. 
From a dynamic perspective, corporate investment decisions under any 
model can have an impact on end-user prices. Over - investments unnecessarily 
charge capital costs, which drive up network charges. Network under-investments 
into the grid are directly linked to network congestion which increases congestion 
management costs but also reduces market competition.  Notwithstanding, out of the 
three unbundling options, it is the (Deep) ISO model which may bring about some 
specific problems concerning investment. Some authors39 call such problems 
“strategic investment withholding”. Basically, the starting point is the double goal of 
the unbundling regulation: to strengthen cross-border interconnector capacity 
(allowing more trade) and to increase market competition. The “strategic investment 
withholding” is but the EC argument that vertically integrated utilities would not 
have adequate incentives to invest on cross-border connections as this could 
decrease their market power as incumbents. How can this apply to the (deep) ISO 
model?  
In the Independent System Operator option, although the ownership of 
transmission and generation assets can be integrated, there is a full separation 
between system operations and transmission facility ownership, investment and 
maintenance, and the ownership of both generation and marketing businesses as 
well. This means that the ISO does not own (nor maintain) transmission assets, but it 
has the responsibility for scheduling and dispatching generation and load. In 
performing such tasks, the ISO is the entity which manages the allocation of the 
(scarce) transmission capacity. Moreover, when an ISO have the authority to define 
and to decide on new network investments (“deep” ISO) it can apply the “investment 
obligation” to the Transmission Operator. Then, this model transfers the capacity 
and authority concerning network investments from the Transmission Operator to 
the ISO which will engage a rather uncommon situation where the decision-maker 
and the risk-taker – the investor - will become different entities. A possible solution 
to this problem would be to tender the investment projects. In this case, there would 
be also the participation of a third party in the tender and the Transmission Operator 
would not be forced to invest. Anyway, this could not completely solve the problem: 
although tendered transmission investments can be very convenient for most of new, 
large projects, yet non-separable investments (network upgrading, for example) 
could not be easy to handle. 
                                                 
39
 For example, Özdemir et al. (2009), Pielow et al. (2008) and  Balmert and Brunekreeft (2009).  
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However, even under a theoretical perspective, the “strategic investment 
withholding” argument may be not straightforward. When a vertically integrated 
utility has a short generation capacity compared to retail, then it may be eventually 
interested in increased cross-border capacity in order to purchase power. The same 
applies when the incumbent integrated utilities have excess capacity and low 
variable costs (Balmert and Brunekreeft, 2009). 
It seems clear that the increasing complexity of the European Energy 
Market, namely its transmission system will probably require a strengthening of the 
monitoring and intervention capacity of European agencies in the next years. The 
system deals with 42 TSOs from 34 countries and the power system serves 525 
million citizens, generates 828 GW and involves 305,000 km of transmission lines 
managed by the TSOs. The demand is about 3,4000 TWh/year and exchanges attain 
400 TWh/year which means less than 12% of demand. Total infrastructure 
investment needs to attain the EU goals for 2020 amount to 35,000 km of new 
transmission lines and upgrades of 7,000 km of existing lines across 34 European 
countries. It is widely recognized that the EU network systems require significant 
upgrade, replacement and addition of infrastructure to ensure a reliable electricity 
delivery and supply, in particular to integrate the increasingly deployed renewable 
energy sources. 
Figure 3. EU Network investment needs (2010-2020) 
 
    Source: Dobbeni (2010) 
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New transmission investment projects must answer the three main drivers of 
the EU energy policy: security of supply (SoS), integration of renewable energy 
sources (RES) and the completion of the Internal Energy Market (IEM).  
Most probably, electricity generation from renewable sources will have to 
be higher than the 20% share planned for 2020, as transport and heating are not 
expected to attain EU energy and climate targets by then. Some studies indicate a 
share of 30 to 35% of electricity generation from RES that must be reached in 2020 
which represents a huge challenge for the European network because it will have to 
balance large amounts of variable renewable power from a lot of distributed 
generator plants. 
Current electricity transmission and distribution systems were designed over 
40 years ago to serve large, centralized conventional power plants. The new power 
system is planned to be built on micro-grids and smart grids that use advanced 
communication and control technologies to connect and distribute small renewable 
energy generators. As a consequence, those intelligent grids will have to be linked 
up into a super grid by building new interconnections. This will guarantee the 
security of supply at all times by transporting large energy leads across regions 
(EREC and Greenpeace International, 2010). However, to attain such targets, a 
massive investment on R&D, namely on Information Technology (IT), involving all 
stakeholders and an active EC participation and funding must be accomplished. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
The two networks under analysis have quite different features which 
naturally impose diverse regulatory options. Electricity is a single product industry 
while in communications there is a proliferation of services, with an increasing 
degree of complementarily. Additionally, the rate of technological innovation is 
quite different among these sectors. In communication sector there is an increasing 
high rate of new services, new networks functionalities and, more recently, the 
convergence of networks. This rapidly changing environment reshapes competition 
features and demands specific regulatory approach. Meanwhile, in the last decade, 
the electricity sector has been experiencing an innovation dynamic on generation 
that is now leading to a deep revolution on the grids. 
Regarding the unbundling issue, we conclude that the regulatory policy in 
communications is much less mandatory than in electricity. In order to promote 
competition the European regulators follow a policy of mandatory network access. 
Only recently we observe functional separation of some incumbent firms to enhance 
competition and until now there is no recent case of ownership or structural 
separation in the major telecommunications firms (Cave and Hatta, 2009). 
The electricity industry innovation rate has also been much lower than for 
the communications. This feature certainly contributes for the deeper 
implementation of the unbundling process. Meanwhile, the sector technical 
characteristics maintain, at least until the IEM is accomplished, the need for a strict 
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unbundling regulation, reinforced by the innovation effort at the network level. 
Therefore, the regulatory experience in this sector, in particular the identification of 
the problems with functional and legal unbundling, brings important lessons for the 
communications’ regulatory policy, namely: 
(i) The evaluation of costs associated to the formation of a new ITSO firm. 
Beyond initial costs, there are also additional costs for (high quality data) 
information systems. Social and cultural costs may also be remarkable as the 
negotiation with stakeholders may be rather complicated. The costs from the 
loss of scale economies for those firms that were previously integrated will be 
very high.  
(ii) Between 2000 and 2009, the electricity sector has been an important player 
in the merger business. As refereed by Pollitt (2009) at the beginning of this 
year, vertical integration has increased, either within the electricity sector or 
by convergent mergers (through the acquisition of gas assets). This trend has 
created a new scenario opposite to the EC unbundling measures. A similar 
corporate move may be plausible in the telecommunications sector. 
(iii) The empowerment of the European Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) is pivotal for successful market integration and for 
competition. Therefore, the final compromise on ACER almost as an advisory 
role - to TSOs, national regulatory boards, the European Commission, the 
European Council and the EU Parliament   - may become a strategic error. 
The same reasoning applies to the BEREC.    
(iv) Under-investment is linked to network congestion and to adverse selection. 
Some unbundling models may involve an increased regulatory burden on 
companies and their investment strategies that can compromise their 
expectations. 
The solutions to these problems certainly will be important insights to the 
communications sector, in particular the answers to promote the investment. Until 
now, most of the European countries implemented accounting separation. Some also 
implemented functional separation (UK, and more recently, Sweden and Italy). This 
path approximates communications to the electricity sector. However, with the 
recent changes introduced by NGN the old questions of vertical separation emerged 
once again, especially the ones related to market power and the incentives to invest. 
Some claim that, with competing networks, vertical separation might no longer be 
defendable. Others still strengthen the advantages of vertical separation, arguing that 
the alternative technologies had not yet created real competition in the market. We 
conclude that the analysis of the competition level between operators that combine 
different technologies is a crucial step to discuss the regulatory options on 
unbundling in the communications sector. Overall, it is worth to stress that 
communication regulators can extract important knowledge from the experience 
with ownership separation in the electricity markets. 
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Appendix 
 
Table I.  Broadband lines by countries, July 2009 
lines %
Austria 1818547 1,52
Belgium 3041315 2,55
Bulgaria 905340 0,76
Cyprus 166681 0,14
Czech Republic 1867535 1,56
Denmark 2049975 1,72
Estonia 352739 0,30
Finland 1626700 1,36
France 18763211 15,72
Germany 24100288 20,19
Greece 1753434 1,47
Hungary 1728021 1,45
Ireland 948814 0,79
Italy 11888074 9,96
Latvia 394973 0,33
Lithuania 609408 0,51
Luxembourg 153995 0,13
Malta 108554 0,09
Netherlands 6221800 5,21
Poland 4898277 4,10
Portugal 1868453 1,57
Romania 2649371 2,22
Slovakia 772024 0,65
Slovenia 449024 0,38
Spain 9477901 7,94
Sweden 3009978 2,52
United Kingdom 17756507 14,87
Total 119380939 100,00
Countries
Total
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Source: EC (2009b) 
 
 
Table II. Concentration in the wholesale electricity markets in Europe (2006/2007) 
 
Source: EC(2009) 
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Table III. Concentration in the retail electricity markets in Europe (2006/2007) 
 
Source: EC(2009) 
Table IV. Concentration (in terms of capacity) in the wholesale electricity markets in Europe 
(2007/2008) 
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                  Source: EC (2009) 
Table V. Concentration in the retail electricity markets in Europe (2007/2008) 
 
Source: EC (2009) 
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